

# STPA Step 4


## Building Formal Scenarios

### A New Scenario Approach

John Thomas

# Tutorial Objective

- These short tutorials are **not training classes**
- We cannot cover everything in these tutorial sessions.
- The objective is to introduce some of the core concepts so new attendees can follow the presentations this week.
- Training and practice with a qualified instructor are needed to apply these techniques and become proficient (as with most techniques). These short tutorials are subsets of larger training classes.



# New STPA scenario approach has been tested for 8 years

## Examples:

- (Nuclear) A New Process for Building STPA Causal Scenarios, John Thomas, 2016 MIT STAMP Workshop
- (Space) A Process for STPA: STAMP Accident Model of HITOMI and Expansion to Future Safety Culture, John Thomas and Nancy Leveson (MIT), Masa Katahira and Naoki Ishimama (**JAXA**), Nobuyuki Hoshino (JAMSS), 2017 MIT STAMP Workshop
- (Aircraft) Systems Theoretic Process Analysis Applied to **Air Force** Acquisition Technical Requirements Development, Sarah Summers, MIT Thesis, 2017
- (Aircraft) STPA Applied to Manned-Unmanned Teaming, Jeremiah Robertson, MIT Thesis, 2019
- (Auto) STPA Applied to Autonomous Vehicles, Jeff Stafford (**Renesas**), John Thomas (MIT), 2019 MIT STAMP Workshop
- (Software) STPA Applied to AV Software, Shaun Mooney (**Codethink**), John Thomas (MIT), 2019
- (Auto) Application of Hierarchy to STPA: A Human Factors Study on Vehicle Automation, Rachel Cabosky, 2020, MIT Thesis (collaboration with **GM**)
- (Military Aviation) Evaluation of STPA for Aircraft Safety Assessment, **US Army**, 2021
- (Aviation) Rotary-Wing Aircraft Development: Cybersecurity and Safety STPA Status Report, MIT & MIT-LL, 2021
- (Aviation) A Top-Down, Safety-Driven Approach to Architecture Development for Complex Systems, Justin Poh, MIT Thesis, 2022
- (Aviation) System-Theoretic Safety Analysis for Teams of Collaborative Controllers, Andrew N. Kopeikin, MIT Dissertation, 2024
- (Communications) Brittany Bishop, MIT Thesis, 2024
- (Software) **Qualcomm**, 2023-2024
- (Software) **Google**, 2023-2024

In all cases, the new approach has found loss scenarios and causes that had been previously overlooked

# New Scenario Approach

## Advantages and Disadvantages Observed

### Disadvantages

- More rules and structure
- Takes longer to teach & learn
- Unclear if it takes longer to perform (less time in some cases)


### Advantages

- The rules and structure provide more guidance
- Enables a more directed search, less ad-hoc and informal
- The rationale for the scenarios and how you found them is clearer.
- So far, the new process has always captured additional cases that were previously overlooked
- The top-down approach was more scalable to extremely complex systems compared to previous STPA attempts
- Less repetition in the results (shorter documentation, higher information density)
- Provides clear exit criteria to rigorously review and find gaps
- Enables automation of some parts of Step 4
- The formal structure can enable mathematical proofs for properties like scenario coverage
- Improved consistency and repeatability. Less dependence on who is doing the analysis.

# Goals for new scenario approach


- Provide scenario guidance for new practitioners who may get stuck
- Provide a formal structure for scenarios (similar to UCA syntax)
- Provide a way to review scenario completeness and find gaps
- Handle more complexity: Implement a top-down strategy, not a backward search strategy.

# STPA Step 3 Rigor: Unsafe Control Actions (UCA)





Example UCA:

“UCA-1: Computer provides Shift-to-Park cmd while vehicle is moving [H-1]”




Can we make STPA Step 4 more like this?

# Forward vs. Backward Search






# Top-Down Search




# Building Scenarios


1. Define small number of high-level scenarios
  - Start with broad, abstract scenarios
  - Consider each class of scenario factors
  - Easy to review, show coverage, completeness, etc.
2. Identify potential solutions
  - Requirements
  - Modify control actions
  - Modify types of feedback
  - Modify responsibilities
  - Etc.
3. Refine into more detailed scenarios (if solutions not found)
  - Include more design detail
  - Can be done in parallel with development




# STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs



# STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs




# STPA Step 4B: Potential control actions not followed properly




# Four Classes of Formal Scenarios


## Class 1




## Class 2



## Class 3




## Class 4




# Four Classes of Formal Scenarios


## Class 1




## Class 2



## Class 3




## Class 4



# STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs

**UCA-2:**  
**<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>**




**Class 1:**  
**<Feedback/input> \_\_\_  
was adequate**


**Class 2:**  
**<Feedback/input> \_\_\_  
was inadequate**



# STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs




## STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs



### Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

- **Output:** UCA-1: <Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>
- **Input:** Class 1: <Input> correctly showed that <Context>


# General Transfer Function Concept




## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

- **Output:** UCA-1: <Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>
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
# General Transfer Function Concept



## STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs



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


UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes


## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_






# Example: Mars Polar Lander







# Mars Polar Lander




# Scenario Archetypes

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- UCA: <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_




# Scenario Archetypes

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
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when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_




# Scenario Archetypes

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
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
## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

## Scenario Archetypes




## Refined Scenarios

*Ask: Why would <Controller> make this decision?*

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

## Scenario Archetypes




## Refined Scenarios

***Why would <Controller> make this decision?***

- Because <Controller> is designed to default to \_\_\_\_ if \_\_\_\_ (will ignore \_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_)
- Because <Controller> also received \_\_\_\_, so it appeared reasonable to <Control Action>
- Because there is no other \_\_\_\_, so other control actions were not feasible
- Etc.

If you have trouble, a generic controller model can help you ask better questions & find actionable causes.

# Generic Controller Model




**Class 1 Scenario Archetype:**

**Output:** UCA

**Input:** Correctly indicates UCA context  
(but other inputs may override or conflict)




# Generic Controller Model




**Class 1 Scenario Archetype:**                      **Output:** UCA                      **Input:** Correctly indicates UCA context (but other inputs may override or conflict)

# Generic Controller Model



**Class 1 Scenario Archetype:**      **Output:** UCA      **Input:** Correctly indicates UCA context (but other inputs may override or conflict)




# Refining Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

## Common causes of Scenario Archetype 1:


- A Responsibilities (e.g., desired end states) that would produce this UCA
- B Control algorithms or decision-making rationale that would explain the UCA
- C Process models that would explain this UCA
- D Interpretation rules / process model updates that would explain the UCA
- E Internal controller states/modes that would explain the UCA (failure, lame duck mode, etc.)
- F Controller inputs (control actions, feedback, or other inputs) that would explain the UCA
  - E.g., Conflicting/contradictory inputs, inputs from another controller, etc.
  - If the input is another UCA, then make sure the new UCA is recorded in STPA Step 3. The new UCA will be analyzed using the same process.
- G Etc.

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

# Scenario Archetypes



# Refined Scenarios




**Discussion:** Responsibilities can be:


- Fixed (hardcoded, embedded in design of algorithm)
- Dynamic (provided in real-time as a control action input into the controller)
- Adaptive (developed and changed by the controller as needed)

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

## Scenario Archetypes




## Refined Scenarios




UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_

## Scenario Archetypes




## Refined Scenarios



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

# Scenario Archetypes



# Refined Scenarios

D

## Interpretation of inputs

In some situations, <Controller> will interpret \_\_\_\_ as an indicator of \_\_\_\_\_. This interpretation can underestimate \_\_\_\_\_, causing \_\_\_\_\_.


When <Feedback/input 1> conflicts with <feedback/input 2>, <Controller> may assume \_\_\_\_\_

When <feedback/input> is not available, <Controller> may assume \_\_\_\_\_

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

# Scenario Archetypes

# Refined Scenarios




D

## Update Process Model

Unsafe PM Update	Unsafe Feedback or Inputs
PM-1 is not updated when ____ PM-1 is the initial (default) belief before feedback/input ____ received	Feedback/input ____ is (or is not) provided when ____
PM-1 is updated incorrectly due to feedback/input ____ that indicates ____	Feedback/input ____ is provided when ____
PM-1 is updated too late (or early) due to ____	Feedback/input ____ is delayed (or too early) when ____
PM-1 stops updating too soon before ____ PM-1 continues to be updated too long after ____	Feedback/input ____ is applied too long after (stopped too soon before) ____






# Refined Scenarios


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
Not Provided  
Causes Hazard




Provided  
Causes Hazard



Too early /  
too late




Stopped too soon /  
Applied too long



<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_

# Scenario Archetypes



# Refined Scenarios




## Controller States / Modes


- If <Controller> is in \_\_\_\_\_ mode, it will continue to <Control Action> using alternate input \_\_\_\_\_.
- If <Controller> \_\_\_ is disabled, then <Controller> can \_\_\_\_\_.

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

## Scenario Archetypes




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


UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides \_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_

# Scenario Archetypes




# Refined Scenarios




# Four Classes of Formal Scenarios


## Class 1




## Class 2



## Class 3




## Class 4



# STPA Step 4A: Identify scenarios that cause UCAs

**UCA-2:**  
**<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>**




Class 1:  
Feedback/input \_\_\_\_  
was adequate

Class 2:  
Feedback/input \_\_\_\_  
was inadequate

# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype

**UCA-2:**  
**<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>**



**Class 2:**  
**Feedback/input \_\_\_\_  
was inadequate**

# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype


UCA-2:

<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

- Feedback to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Context> is true

Class 2:  
Feedback/Input did  
not adequately  
indicate \_\_\_\_




<UCA Context> is true




# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype

**UCA-2:**  
<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>




# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype

**UCA-2:**  
<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>



# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype

**UCA-2:**  
<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>



# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype


**UCA-2:**  
<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>

**Class 2:**  
Feedback/Input did  
not adequately  
indicate \_\_\_\_

**Why? (non-failures)**

- Because the \_\_\_\_ metric is estimated from \_\_\_\_ that uses different \_\_\_\_
- Because the \_\_\_\_ feedback is outdated due to \_\_\_\_ second feedback delay
- Etc.

**Discussion:** The “Why” answers may come from SMEs, not the STPA practitioner. You may not be an expert in the system. The point is for you to use this framework to ask questions and approach the SMEs to find these answers.




**<UCA Context> is true**

# STPA Step 4: Class 2 Scenario Archetype

UCA-2:

<Controller> provides  
<Control Action> when  
<Context>

**Discussion:** This is the generic form for the Class 2 Scenario Archetype.



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype Inadequate Feedback

**Output:**  
<Feedback/Input> to  
<Controller> did not  
adequately indicate  
<Context>


**Input:** <Process> is actually  
<Context>

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control Action>  
when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_




## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>




# Example: Mars Polar Lander





# Mars Polar Lander






# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>




# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in air
- <Process> is actually <Context>




# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in the air
- Lander is actually in the air



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

# Refined Scenarios

*Ask: What can cause this Scenario Archetype?*

Consider:


- 1) Failure causes
- 2) No failures

# Example: Mars Polar Lander

## Refined Scenarios

### Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



### Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in air
- Lander is in the air

*What can cause this?*

- 1) Failure causes
- 2) No failures

What does "no failure" mean?

- It means the sensors, etc., worked as specified

What does "touchdown sensor worked" mean?


- It means the sensor output was as specified for the sensor input

We know the sensor feedback was [NOT IN AIR]. What was the input?

- If output = [NOT IN AIR], then input = [VIBRATION > X]

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes



# Refined Scenarios

## Why?

- Because the \_\_\_ metric is estimated from \_\_\_ that uses different \_\_\_
- Because the \_\_\_ feedback is outdated due to \_\_\_ second feedback delay
- Etc.

# Refining Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Feedback/Information

## Common causes of Scenario Archetype 2:

- Feedback/info missing from design/concept
- Feedback/info not provided
- Conflicting feedback/info
- Incorrect feedback/info provided
- Too early or too late (delayed) feedback/info
- Measurement inaccuracies
- Dropouts
- Corruption
- Content incomplete
- Feedback/info provided in a way the controller can't use
- Overloaded or too much feedback/info
- Etc.

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

# Refined Scenarios

## Too early or too late info

<Feedback> can be sent too early  
before \_\_\_\_\_ has occurred.



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

# Refined Scenarios

## No info provided

<Feedback> is not provided  
when \_\_\_\_\_ is initialized, reset, or  
on power up.

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

# Refined Scenarios


## Overloaded or too much info

If <Process> is overloaded, then there might not be any indication that <Context>


**Discussion:** These scenarios are used to help us think about mitigations. E.g., <Controller> currently has no feedback to indicate process overloading, so the design doesn't currently have any way to correct it.

# Four Classes of Formal Scenarios


## Class 1




## Class 2



## Class 3



## Class 4



# STPA Step 4: Class 3 Scenario Archetype


**UCA-2:**  
**<Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>**

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

We need to look at how the UCA can be emulated due to interactions in this region.

Constructing Scenario Archetype 3:

- Suppose the UCA did not happen (invert the UCA). The controller provided a "safe" control action.
- BUT... something happened on the control path making it as if the UCA had occurred




# STPA Step 4: Class 3 Scenario Archetype

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide \_\_\_\_\_
- <Process> receives \_\_\_\_\_

This behavior would emulate the UCA, even if our controller does the right thing.  
How could this happen? Other controllers? Spoofing? Other causes?




UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control Action>  
when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_



## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information


- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in the air
- Lander is in the air



## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution


- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in the air
- Lander is in the air



## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- Controller does not provide Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Lander receives Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

# Refined Scenarios

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:



*Ask: What can cause this Scenario Archetype?*

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

# Refined Scenarios


## Why?

- Some other <Controller> could generate <Control Action> and send it to \_\_\_\_\_
- <Controller> sends <Control Action> with Ignore bit set, but \_\_\_\_\_.
- Etc.


**Discussion:** How would <Controlled Process> know to ignore this? It might not know.

# Four Classes of Formal Scenarios


## Class 1




## Class 2



## Class 3



## Class 4



# STPA Step 4: Class 4 Scenario Archetype

## UCA-2:


<Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>

### Class 4 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Process Behavior

We need to look at how the UCA can be emulated due to interactions in this region.


#### Constructing Scenario Archetype 4:

- Suppose the UCA did not happen (invert the UCA), and was not received by the controlled process.
- BUT... something happened with the controlled process and its other interactions making it as if the UCA had been provided.



# STPA Step 4: Class 4 Scenario Archetype

**UCA-2:**  
**<Controller> provides <Control Action> when <Context>**



**Class 4 Scenario Archetype:**  
**Inadequate Process Behavior**


- <Process> does not receive \_\_\_\_
- <Process> does \_\_\_\_ anyway

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control Action>  
when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_



## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate process behavior

- <Process> does not receive a <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> applies <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

# Example: Mars Polar Lander

UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior


- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- Controller does not provide Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Lander receives Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in air
- Lander is in the air



## Class 4 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate process behavior

- <Process> does not receive a <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> applies <Control Action> when <Context>

# Example: Mars Polar Lander


UCA-2:  
Thruster Controller  
provides  
Disable-Thruster Cmd  
when spacecraft is in the air

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Controller Behavior

- Controller provides Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Touchdown Input to Controller correctly indicated it's in the air

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate Control Execution

- Controller does not provide Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air
- Lander receives Disable-Thruster Cmd when spacecraft is in the air



## Class 2 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate feedback/information

- Touchdown feedback does not indicate it's in the air
- Lander is in the air



## Class 4 Scenario Archetype: Inadequate process behavior

- Thrusters do not receive Disable command (when spacecraft is in the air)
- Thrusters are disabled (when in the air)



UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

# Refined Scenarios

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate process behavior

- <Process> does not receive a <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> applies <Control Action> when <Context>

*Ask: What can cause this Scenario Archetype?*

UCA-2:  
<Controller> provides <Control  
Action> when <Context>

# Scenario Archetypes

## Class 1 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Controller Behavior

- <Controller> provides \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_
- <Input> to <Controller> correctly indicated \_\_\_\_\_

## Class 2 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate feedback/information

- <Feedback/Input> to <Controller> did not adequately indicate <Context>
- <Process> is actually <Context>

## Class 3 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate Control Execution

- <Controller> does not provide <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> receives a <Control Action> when <Context>

## Class 4 Scenario Archetype:

### Inadequate process behavior


- <Process> does not receive a <Control Action> when <Context>
- <Process> applies <Control Action> when <Context>

# Refined Scenarios

## Why?

- <Process> may mechanically \_\_\_\_
- <Process> may run out of \_\_\_\_
- <Process> may see that \_\_\_\_ is full, in which case <Process> will automatically \_\_\_\_, which results in \_\_\_\_.
- If <Process> is in \_\_\_\_ mode, then all \_\_\_\_ will be ignored.

# Scenario Archetype Generation



Scenario Archetype Table:

	UCA type 1: not providing causes hazard (UCA-#)	UCA type 2: providing causes hazard (UCA-#)	UCA type 3: too early, too late, out of order causes hazard (UCA-#)	UCA type 4: stopped too soon, applied too long causes hazard (UCA-#)
Scenario Class 1: Unsafe Controller Behavior	1)<controller> doesn't provide <cmd> 2)<controller> received feedback (or other inputs) that indicated <context>	1)<controller> provides <cmd> 2)<controller> received feedback (or other inputs) that indicated <context>	1)<controller> provides <cmd> too late/early/out of order 2)<controller> received feedback (or other inputs) that indicated <context> on time / in order	1)<controller> stops/continues providing <cmd> too soon/long 2)<controller> received feedback (or other inputs) that indicated <context> on time
Scenario Class 2: Unsafe Feedback Path	1)feedback (or other inputs) received by <controller> does not adequately indicate <context> 2)<context> is true	1)feedback (or other inputs) received by <controller> does not adequately indicate <context> 2)<context> is true	1)feedback (or other inputs) received by <controller> does not indicate <context> (too late/early/out of order) 2)<context> is true	1)feedback (or other inputs) received by <controller> does not indicate <context> (inappropriate duration) 2)<context> is true
Scenario Class 3: Unsafe Control Path	1)<controller> does provide <cmd> when <context> 2)<cmd> is not received by <controlled process> when <context>	1)<controller> does not provide <cmd> when <context> 2)<controlled process> receives <cmd> when <context>	1)<controller> does not provide <cmd> <context> (not too late/early/out of order) 2)<cmd> is received by <controlled process> <context> (too late/early/out of order)	1)<controller> provides <cmd> with appropriate duration 2)<cmd> is received by <controlled process> with <context> (inappropriate duration)
Scenario Class 4: Unsafe Controlled Process Behavior	1)<cmd> is received by <controlled process> when <context> 2)<controlled process> does not respond by <...>	1)<cmd> is not received by <controlled process> when <context> 2)<controlled process> responds by <...>	1)<cmd> is not received by <controlled process> <context> (not too late/early/out of order) 2)<controlled process> responds by <...> <context> (too late/early/out of order)	1)<cmd> is received by <controlled process> with appropriate duration 2)<controlled process> does not respond by <...> with <context> (inappropriate duration)

(Thomas, 2016), (Thomas, 2017), (Cabosky, 2020)

# STPA Scenarios should cover:




Figure 2.18: Unsafe Control Actions can be caused by (1) unsafe controller behavior and (2) inadequate feedback and other inputs




Figure 2.19: Generic control loop illustrating 1) the control path and 2) other factors that can affect the controlled process

# How to run an STPA project

Let's discuss who would do this and how they  
would coordinate with others

# STPA Project Participants

