

Towards a STAMP-Based Safety Plans Approach for Construction Projects

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Motivation

- **Accidents in Construction Industry**
- More fatalities in construction than in any other major industry in the U.S. (Data from 2014)
- That is the situation in many countries
- In Greece the number of fatalities has dropped due to the economic recession - but it is still considered high
- **STAMP Applied to Construction Site Safety**
- Up to now no works available!

Construction Projects: Safety Policies and SMS

Two layers:

1. Laws and regulations
 - Define system elements, their responsibilities and tools (i.e. a “top level” SMS) to ensure a minimum safety level
2. Construction companies with “in house” SMS



The Situation in Greece

Two sets of national laws and regulations in relation to construction safety

- The first set define:
 - The components of the “Top Level” SMS, their roles, their responsibilities
 - A set of minimum safety requirement that should be enforced in every construction site
 - A set of tools to ensure a minimum level of safety
- The second set define:
 - Rules and constraints for specific construction activities and specific construction sites
- Owners have to submit – among other things – a Construction Safety Plan in order to receive the permit

Construction Safety Plans

- A preliminary hazard analysis of the construction project

General Description of
Something That is
Prerequisite to Accidents

Potential Harmful Events / Conditions

| Hazards | Sources of Hazards | | Construction Phases | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--|---------------------|---------|
| | | | Phase 1 | Phase 2 |
| 2100 | 2101 | Collision Vehicle - Vehicle | 1 | 1 |
| Vehicles and machinery movement | 2102 | Collision Vehicle - Human | 1 | 1 |
| | 2103 | Collision Vehicle - Obstacle | 1 | 1 |
| | 2104 | Crush Vehicle - Vehicle | 1 | 1 |
| | 2105 | Crush Vehicle - Obstacle | 1 | 1 |
| | 2106 | Uncontrolled Traffic - System Failures | | 1 |
| | 2107 | Uncontrolled Traffic-Incomplete Immobilization | | |
| | 2108 | Movement on Rails-Insufficient Protection | | |
| | 2109 | Movement on Rails - Derailment | | |

| | | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|-----|---------------------------|
| ΦΑΣΕΙΣ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ | 1) Χωματουργικά | 1.1 | Προετοιμασία εργοταξίου |
| | | 1.2 | Καθαιρέσεις - Αποξηλώσεις |
| | | 1.3 | Εκσκαφές |
| | | 1.4 | Επιχώσεις |
| | 2) Τεχνικά έργα | 2.1 | Σκυροδετήσεις |
| | | 2.2 | Κράσπεδα-πλακοστρώσεις |
| | 3) Λοιπές εργασίες επισκευών | 3.1 | Αστικός εξοπλισμός |
| | | 3.2 | Δίκτυο ομβρίων |

| Κίνδυνοι | Πηγές κινδύνων | Φάση 1 | | | | Φάση 2 | | Φάση 3 | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|---|------|------|------|--------|------|--------|------|
| | | Φ1.1 | Φ1.2 | Φ1.3 | Φ1.4 | Φ2.1 | Φ2.2 | Φ3.1 | Φ3.2 |
| 6400 | 6401 | | | | | | | | |
| Άλλη πηγή | 6402 | | | | | | | | |
| 07000. Ηλεκτροπληξία | | | | | | | | | |
| 7100 Δίκτυα - Εγκαταστάσεις | 7101 | Προϋπάρχοντα εναέρια δίκτυα | 1 | | | | 3 | | |
| | 7102 | Προϋπάρχοντα υπόγεια δίκτυα | | | | 3 | | | |
| | 7103 | Προϋπάρχοντα εντοιχισμένα δίκτυα | | | | | | | |
| | 7104 | Προϋπάρχοντα επίτοιχα δίκτυα | | | | | | | |
| | 7105 | Δίκτυο ηλεκτροδότησης έργου | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
| | 7106 | Ανεπαρκής αντικεραυνική προστασία | | | | | | | |
| 7200 Εργαλεία Μηχανήματα | 7201 | Ηλεκτροκίνητα μηχανήματα | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 2 |
| | 7202 | Ηλεκτροκίνητα εργαλεία | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 2 |
| 08000.Πνιγμός-Ασφυξία | | | | | | | | | |
| 8100 Νερό | 8101 | Υποβρύχιες εργασίες | | | | | | | |
| | 8102 | Εργασίες εν πλω | | | | | | | |
| | 8103 | Βύθιση / ανατροπή πλωτού μέσου | | | | | | | |
| | 8104 | Παρόχθιες / παράλιες εργασίες. Πτώση | | | | | | | |
| | 8105 | Παρόχθιες / παράλιες εργασίες. Ανατροπή μηχανήματος | | | | | | | |
| | 8106 | Υπαίθριες λεκάνες. Δεξαμενές. Πτώση | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | |
| | 8107 | Υπαίθριες λεκάνες. Δεξαμενές. Ανατροπή μηχανήματος | | | | | | | |
| | 8108 | Πλημμύρα. Κατάκλιση έργου | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 |
| 8200 Ασφυκτικό περιβάλλον | 8201 | Βάλτοι. Ιλείς. Κινούμενες άμμοι | | | | | | | |
| | 8202 | Υπόνομοι, βόθροι, βιολογικοί καθαρισμοί | | | | | | | |
| | 8203 | Βύθιση σε σκυρόδεμα, ασβέστη κλπ | | | | | 3 | | |
| | 8204 | Εργασία σε κλειστό χώρο. Ανεπάρκεια οξυγόνου | | | | | | | |

A Proposed STAMP – Based Approach

- **Key assumption**

The construction process is brought to completion thanks to an “adaptive system”

The system must achieve different goals in each construction phase

Therefore, it has to change its structure and as result its interactive behavior, typically in its “lower” hierarchical levels


Owner / Authority X

Senior Engineer of Company Y

Supervising Engineer

Construction Site

• Phase 1




• Phase 2



STAMP – Based Safety Plans Approach

- Identify the losses (human lives, property damage, environmental degradation, time, money)
- Define the “core” control structure
- Identify the:
 - a) construction phases and sub-phases
 - b) system elements of the lower hierarchical levels needed to fulfill the tasks of each phase and sub-phase (workers, equipment, machinery etc.)
 - c) environmental conditions useful to the analysis (e.g. terrain)
 - d) laws and regulations
- For each construction phase identify the hazards, as per the STAMP definition
- For each hazard identify:
 - a) causal scenarios (do not forget to note the assumptions made)
 - b) safety specification and/or possible corrective actions

A Typical “Core” Control Structure




Construction Phases and Sub-phases

Schedule Duration: 153.00

Schedule Start Date: 6/5/10

Schedule Finish Date: 11/5/10

Toll Road - Paving Schedule



Hazards

- Phase – Excavation
 - H1: A person or worker is standing/working under - or passing through - the excavators' range cycle
 - H2: Excavator within the vicinity of overhead electric lines
- Translate hazards into safety constraints



Causal Scenarios – Step 1

- Create the control structure of the “micro system” responsible for the execution of the tasks in each construction phase
- Assign to the workers and to the machineries involved in the construction phase the roles of the feedback loop elements

E.g. The worker X is the spotter of the excavation (i.e. has the role of the sensor). The operator of the excavator has the role of the controller. The excavator has the role of the actuator




Figure 2.14 Things that can go wrong in the control loop

Causal Scenarios – Step 2

- Create scenarios on how each hazard could be realized (i.e. Apply directly STEP 2 of STPA)
- Example: H1: A person or worker is standing/working under - or passing through - the excavators' range cycle
- H1 – Sc1 The operator of the excavator is not aware that a worker is close to the machinery because: a) although the spotter detected the worker and yelled/signaled the operator to stop, the operator was not able to hear the spotter due to noise. b) although the spotter detected the worker and yelled/signaled the operator to stop, the operator was not able to hear the spotter due to noise and the spotter used a sign that was insufficient to attract the vision of the operator or he is was in a spot within operators' vision range
- H1 – Sc2 The spotter is located in a place where he/she can not see the worker entering the vicinity of the excavator

Preliminary Safety Specifications

| Phase/Sub-phase | Accident | Hazard | Causal Scenarios | Safety Recommendations |
|-----------------|------------------------|--------|------------------|--|
| Excavation | Death/Injury of worker | H1 | H1-Sc1 | Radio communication should be in the disposal of the spotter and the operators |
| | | | | The spotter should have in his disposal visual signs to attract the attention of the operators |
| | | | H1-Sc2 | The spotter should be in a positions which will provide him the maximum possible observation range and minimum blind spots |

Why not Applying STEP 1 of STPA?

- You can apply it!
- It was found however to be not so practical for a preliminary hazard analysis in the context of a construction
 - Many control actions
 - Too many assumptions
- More work needs to be done however to be 100% sure of the benefits to omit STEP 1 of STPA

Initial Results

- The proposed approach was applied to a number of small construction projects
- Very promising results
 - Much better quality of results compared to the Safety Plans which were submitted by the owners to receive the construction permit
- More work needs to be done!
 - Improve the approach in various aspects
 - To assess its acceptance by the safety engineers in this domain

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**THANK
YOU!**

