

STPA For Additive Manufacturing Software

STAMP Workshop, MIT, March 22, 2016

Gregory Pope


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


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AM Has Four Basic Steps



AM Applications Doubling by 2020



Currently Hobby Level 3D Printer Hardware and Software



And Industrial Strength 3D Printing Hardware and Software



*Future Pilot Announcement:
Ladies and Gentlemen our flight has
been delayed waiting for the
remainder of our right engine's parts
to be printed and installed.*



There are Multiple 3D Printer Technologies



Printing Technique	Hazardous Materials Used
<u>Stereo Lithography(SLA)</u>	Molten Plastic
<u>Digital Light Processing(DLP)</u>	Heat, Inert Gas
<u>Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM)</u>	Heat
<u>Selective Laser Sintering (SLS)</u>	Laser, Powders
<u>Selective Laser Melting (SLM)</u>	Laser, Metallic Powders, Gases
<u>Electronic Beam Melting (EBM)</u>	Electron Beam, High Voltage
<u>Laminated Object Manufacturing (LOM)</u>	Laser, Sound


Software and Data Heavily Used

+ Additive manufacturing Process Flow

File




Description



Software




Numerous 3D Printer Software Makers



Expert Analysis from Literature

- “Additive Manufacturing Security”, University of Alabama Huntsville
- “Security Challenges with Additive Manufacturing with Metals and Alloys” Yampolskiy, Schutzle, Vaidya and Yasinsac

Additive Manufacturing Security



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Cyber Attack Vectors

- Supply Chain Attacks
- Software and Firmware Updates
- Code Injection
- Modification of 3D Models
- Manufacturing Process Specification

[SECURITY CHALLENGES OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING WITH METALS AND ALLOYS](#)
[Mark Yampolskiy, Lena Schutzle, Uday Vaidya and Alec Yasinsac](#)

Impact on Manufacturing Parameters

- 3D Shape
- Manufacturing Orientation
- Powder Deposition
- Wire Feed Speed
- Targeting and Positioning System
- Fusing Material Patterns
- Timing
- Support Material
- Source Material
- Powder Recycling
- Temperature Control
- Heat Sources
- Chamber Atmosphere
- Post-Processing

[SECURITY CHALLENGES OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING WITH METALS AND ALLOYS](#)

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Cyber Security Conclusions

- Keep AM air gapped to Internet
 - Avoids cyber attacks
 - Avoids cyber theft

- Can STPA tell us anything else we should be aware of?
 - Risks for printed parts
 - Hazards for printed mission critical parts
 - Hazards for printing process
 - Additional security vulnerabilities

Is STPA Useful in Additive Manufacturing Analysis?


- For Identifying:

1. Software System Risks
2. Software System Hazards
3. Cyber Security Vulnerabilities

- Approach:

Compare STPA analysis results done by AM novice to published works of AM experts.

STPA System Model



CAD Subsystem


STPA Guide Phrases

A resource or action required for correct operation is not provided or is not followed.

An incorrect resource or action is provided that leads to a hazard/risk.


A potentially correct resource or action is provided too late, or out of sequence.

A correct resource or control action is stopped too soon or applied too long.



CAD Subsystem Hazards/Risks (16)

Software has bug
Software update has bug
Support software has bug
Software has exploitable vulnerability
Support software has exploitable vulnerability
Version incompatibility
Resolution or precision incompatible with manufacturing tolerances
Design contains errors not caught
User misunderstands feature behavior
Representation does not mimic materials
Design not peer reviewed
Software unable to describe design intent
Error message misunderstood by user
Error message overlooked by user
Error correction not saved
Wrong design or version sent to repository



Repo Subsystem


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
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Repo Subsystem Hazards/Risks (32)

- Wrong version of data format used
- Corrupted STL data file (permissions)
- New version or type of STL format not compatible with print software
- New data not sent
- Duplicate data sent
- Print software buffer not emptied
- Power transient during transmission
- Transmission speed too slow
- Network used is hacked
- Repository on network and is hacked
- UDP/IP protocol used and drops packets
- Ethernet late collisions occur
- Network device overflows
- Bit slip on long zero codes
- Bad copper or optic cable
- Software bug in network device
- Wi-Fi used and is weak
- Wi-Fi is used and multipath fading occurs



- Repository not backed up
- Repository not backed up off site
- Upgrade causes error
- Data migration error
- Repository hacked
- Repository code contains Trojan horse
- Support libraries have vulnerabilities
- Digital format migration errors
- Multiple copies modified concurrently
- Multiple copies outside of repository
- Print file not locked when printing
- Repo software not compatible with printer software
- New version of repo not compatible with printer software
- Repo resolution incompatible with printer software

STL (Standard Tessellation Language) ASCII Format

An ASCII STL file begins with the line

solid name

where name is an optional string (though if name is omitted there must still be a space after solid). The file continues with any number of triangles, each represented by the following lines:

facet normal n1 n2 n3

outer loop

vertex v1x v1y v1z

vertex v2x v2y v2z

vertex v3x v3y v3z

endloop

endfacet

where each n or v is a floating-point number in sign-mantissa-"e"-sign-exponent format, e.g., "2.648000e-002" (noting that each v must be non-negative). The file concludes with endsolid name

Numbers can
not be negative

Numbers in
2.648000e-002
format

STL BINARY Format

32 Bit Floating
Point Numbers
max =
2,147,183,647

Should not
begin with
SOLID

Unsigned 4 byte
integer max =
4,294,967,295

UINT8[80] – Header
UINT32 – Number of triangles

foreach triangle

REAL32[3] – Normal vector

REAL32[3] – Vertex 1

REAL32[3] – Vertex 2

REAL32[3] – Vertex 3

UNIT16 – Attribute byte count

end

Unsigned 2 byte
integer max =
65, 535 but should
be zero in standard
format

3D Printing Subsystem


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
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3D Printing Subsystem Hazards/Risks (50)



Factory Automation Software is yet to be Mission Critical Level

Application Domain	Number Projects	Error Range (Errors/KESLOC)	Normative Error Rate (Errors/KESLOC)	Notes
Automation	55	2 to 8	5	Factory automation
Banking	30	3 to 10	6	Loan processing, ATM
Command & Control	45	0.5 to 5	1	Command centers
Data Processing	35	2 to 14	8	DB-intensive systems
Environment/Tools	75	5 to 12	8	CASE, compilers, etc.
Military -All	125	0.2 to 3	< 1.0	See subcategories
▪ Airborne	40	0.2 to 1.3	0.5	Embedded sensors
▪ Ground	52	0.5 to 4	0.8	Combat center
▪ Missile	15	0.3 to 1.5	0.5	GNC system
▪ Space	18	0.2 to 0.8	0.4	Attitude control system
Scientific	35	0.9 to 5	2	Seismic processing
Telecommunications	50	3 to 12	6	Digital switches
Test	35	3 to 15	7	Test equipment, devices
Trainers/Simulations	25	2 to 11	6	Virtual reality simulator
Web Business	65	4 to 18	11	Client/server sites
Other	25	2 to 15	7	All others

Donald Reifer, "Industry Software Cost, Quality, and Productivity Benchmarks", DoD Software Tech News, July 2004

2016 Benchmark for Factory Automation Better – Donald Reifer



- Assumption is defect rate after one year, not at release as in 2004
- 2 defects per ksloc for Factory Automation codes in 2016 after one year.
- .55 defects per ksloc for Mission Critical codes
- What should defect rate be for 3D mission critical parts then?

Reifer Consultants
<http://reifer.com/>

STPA Lessons Learned

1. STPA facilitated me to think of hazards and risks I could not think of intuitively
2. STPA identified risks and hazards not identified in the literature search
3. STPA helped me research further important topics
4. STPA helped me ask better questions of experts

Sample of STPA Hazard Finds

1. Do not use UDP network protocol with AM (transmission not guaranteed)
2. Have printer buffers large enough to hold the entire print image (don't waste material if data error)
3. Assure the networks used have good QoS (avoid slow part data transmission due to network traffic)
4. Assure the print software can detect and then not use corrupted data
5. Offsite back up for parts data, test offsite backup
6. Air Gap AM from internet to avoid theft and malware
7. Isolate 3D printers from sound recording devices

Network Mitigations by OSI Layer for AM

Make sure application checks
for errors in data integrity

Assure intellectual property protected
with encryption

Assure 3D printer buffer large
enough to hold entire image








Don't ever use UDP with AM

Use high Quality of Service network

Use mature router / firewall technologies


Use fiber optic physical (emi / emc
protection)



OSI MODEL			TCP / IP
7		Application Layer Type of communication: E-mail, file transfer, client/server.	FTP, Telnet, HTTP, SNMP, DNS, OSPF, RIP, Ping, Traceroute
6		Presentation Layer Encryption, data conversion: ASCII to EBCDIC, BCD to binary, etc.	
5		Session Layer Starts, stops session. Maintains order.	
4		Transport Layer Ensures delivery of entire file or message.	TCP (delivery ensured) UDP (delivery NOT ensured)
3		Network Layer Routes data to different LANs and WANs based on network address.	IP (ICMP, IGMP, ARP, RARP)
2		Data Link (MAC) Layer Transmits packets from node to node based on station address.	
1		Physical Layer Electrical signals and cabling.	

Comparison Test

- Literature search found 25 security vulnerabilities
- STPA found 98 security vulnerabilities, hazards, and risks



Conclusion – STPA Rocks

- STPA useful addition to literature search and expert consultation for Additive Manufacturing hazard, risk, and security analysis
- STPA useful for non-real time systems analysis

Next Steps – Empirical Approach

- Mutation of 3D printer file:
 - Single bit flip
 - Word omission
 - End of transmission omission

- Assure that each seeded error is detected and data not used by 3D printer.