

# Safety Analysis of a Low-cost Insulin Infusion Pump using STPA: A Case Study with a Brazilian Company

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## Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus

### Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus

- Disease that affects the metabolism of nutrients
- Caused by lack of insulin production by pancreas

### Type 1 Diabetes not adequately treated causes:

- Acute crises of hyperglycemia: blood glucose too high, and

- Long- term complications



Cardiovascular  
diseases



Kidney  
disease



Diabetic eye  
disease



Amputation of  
lower limbs

Source: International Diabetes Federation (IDF), “IDF Diabetes Atlas” 9<sup>th</sup> ed. 2019

# Therapy for Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus

## Intensive insulin therapy for type 1 diabetes

- Protects against complications
- Introduces the risk of hypoglycemia: blood glucose too low
  - Both hyperglycemia and hypoglycemia can be life threatening

Continuous  
subcutaneous  
insulin infusion  
(CSII)



Insulin infusion pump

Multiple Daily  
Injections (MDI)



Insulin pen

Sources:

[https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/insulin\\_3003865](https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/insulin_3003865)

[https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/insulin\\_3113755](https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/insulin_3113755)

## Insulin Pump Therapy versus Multiple Daily Injections

### Insulin pump therapy compared with MDI:

- Provides better blood glucose control, and
- allows a less restricted lifestyle to patient
- However, its cost is higher
  - There is no insulin infusion pump manufactured in Brazil
  - The imported ones are expensive, which limits their use
- Development of a more affordable insulin infusion pump:

- Federal University of São Paulo



- *DeltaLife*, a Brazilian company of medical equipment




## Development team

Multidisciplinary team, including:


- Researchers from the Federal University of São Paulo:
  - Health care for diabetic people,
  - Software development,
  - Electronic design,
  - Mechanical design,
  - Risk Management
- Chief Engineer of *DeltaLife*

# Development evolution

## Proof of concept



## Present prototype




Purpose of the safety analysis using STPA: to support the insulin pump architectural design from a safety perspective.

# Insulin pump therapy


System under analysis

Intensive insulin therapy for type 1 diabetes, with insulin infusion pump



# Insulin dosage

- Insulin pump therapy





## Loss and System Level Hazards

Loss to be prevented:

L-1: Patient death or life-threatening injury

System level hazards:

H1: Hypoglycemia, with blood glucose below 54 mg/dL

- Mental confusion
- Visual disturbances
- Coma

H2: Hyperglycemia, with blood glucose above 250 mg/dL


- Ketoacidosis: increased blood acidity
- Confusion
- Coma

# Hierarchical Control Structure Model

Health care: Diabetes / complications  
Training: Glucose management / insulin pump operation


System boundary

Improved the interaction with heterogeneous specialties




# Unsafe Control Actions

- Human Controller



**Insulin dosage programming**



# Unsafe Control Actions


- Human Controller

## Unsafe control Actions of Human Controller

Control action	Not providing causes hazard	Providing causes hazard	Too early, too late, out of order	Stopped too soon, applied too long
<b>Program insulin dosage</b>	<p>Human controller does not program bolus for meal or blood glucose correction</p> <p>Human controller does not adjust basal dosage for physical activities.</p>	<p>Human controller programs excessive bolus dosage</p> <p>Human controller programs insufficient bolus dosage</p> <p>Human controller programs excessive basal dosage</p> <p>Human controller programs insufficient basal dosage</p> <p>Human controller interrupts infusion inadvertently.</p>	<p>Human controller programs bolus too late in response to meal</p> <p>Human controller programs basal dosage for each hour of the day out of order</p>	<p>Human controller programs bolus too long</p> <p>Human controller programs bolus too short</p>

# Unsafe Control Actions:

- Insulin dosage controller
- Safety controller



## Unsafe Control Actions:

- Insulin dosage controller
- Safety controller


### Unsafe control Actions of Insulin Dosage Controller and Safety Controller

Control action	Not providing causes hazard	Providing causes hazard	Too early, too late, out of order	Stopped too soon, applied too long
<b>Insulin infusion command</b>	<p>Dosage controller does not provide command for basal insulin</p> <p>Dosage controller does not provide command for bolus</p> <p>Dosage controller does not provide command for basal and bolus</p>	<p>Dosage controller commands excessive basal insulin</p> <p>Dosage controller commands insufficient basal insulin</p> <p>Dosage controller commands excessive insulin bolus</p> <p>Dosage controller commands insufficient insulin bolus</p> <p>Dosage controller commands excessive insulin infusion</p>	<p>Dosage controller commands basal insulin for each hour of the day out of order</p>	<p>Dosage controller commands insulin bolus too long</p> <p>Dosage controller commands insulin bolus too short</p>
<b>Automatic shut down</b>	<p>Safety controller does not shut down stepper motor in case of over-infusion</p>	<p>Safety controller shuts down stepper motor when not required, leading to infusion interruption</p>	<p>Safety controller shuts down stepper motor too late in case of over-infusion</p>	

# Loss scenarios for UCA of Human Controller

**UCA: Human controller does not program bolus for meal or blood glucose correction**

Patient ingests food but does not program corresponding bolus




Patient does not perform blood glucose measurement

# Loss scenarios for UCA of Human Controller

**UCA: Human controller programs excessive bolus dosage**

Erroneous programming of insulin pump by patient



Misleading indication at insulin pump display:

- Development error
- Hardware failure

Erroneous (too low) value of blood glucose measurement

- Patient programs bolus but does not ingest corresponding meal
- Erroneous (too high) estimative of meal carbohydrate




# Loss scenarios for UCA of Insulin dosage controller

- Software flaw (requirement / implementation)
- Patient does not replace the battery when required, leading to loss of electrical power
- Physical components failure

**UCA: Dosage controller does not provide command for basal and for bolus**

- Insulin pump used out of temperature limits
- Patient does not replace syringe, leading to lack of insulin.

- Infusion set blocked
- Infusion set disconnected from human body




# Loss scenarios for UCA of Insulin dosage controller

- Erroneous command of dosage controller
- Software flaw
  - Electromagnetic disturbances

**UCA: Dosage controller commands excessive insulin infusion**

Unintended syringe actuation, due to ambient pressure variations



## Requirements from STPA analysis

- Support insulin pump architectural design from the safety point of view

### Examples of safety requirements arising from STPA analysis

Unsafe Control Action	Loss scenario	Requirements to prevent loss scenarios
<b>Human controller programs excessive bolus dosage</b>	Patient performs erroneous (too high) estimative of meal carbohydrate Patient performs erroneous (too low) blood glucose measurement	Selection criteria for insulin pump user: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proficiency on carbohydrate estimative and blood glucose measurement</li> </ul>
	Human controller erroneous programming of the insulin pump	Proficiency on insulin pump use: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• User manual</li> <li>• Training</li> </ul> Insulin pump user interface design: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• User friendly</li> <li>• Limit for maximum and minimum dosage input</li> </ul>
<b>Dosage controller commands excessive insulin infusion</b>	Unintended syringe actuation, due to ambient pressure variations	Syringe plunger shall not move due to ambient pressure variations within the operational environment.

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Thanks for the attention!!!  
Questions?

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