






STAMP AS RISK ANALYSIS METHODS FOR DRINKING WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

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CONTENT

- INTRODUCTION
- SET UP THE SCENE
- RISK ANALYSIS IN WATER PRACTICE
- ▶ ISSUES (RISK, SYSTEM, SYNTHESIS)
- STAMP Concept
- STPA/CAST Exercise
- CONCLUDED REMARKS

INTRODUCTION




INTRODUCTION


▶ Belgrade, SERBIA

Few words

→ Belgrade Public Water Utility









▶ Cyanobacteria (CB) bloom in Surface Water Reservoir

- → Surface Water Reservoir 'VRUTCI' on Djetinja river
- → Main source for Uzice Water Supply System (WSS) (Uzice, SERBIA)
- → Covers more than 60.000 inhabitants
- → Had experienced a visible, large, harmful bloom of potentially toxic CB at the end of 2013
- → Sanitary Authorities issued the ban on using water



Planktothrix rubescens

→ Surface water Reservoir 'VRUTCI' on → City of Uzice, Serbia - panorama Djetinja river, Uzice water source





RA in WATER **REMARKS ISSUES INTRO SCENE STAMP STPA**

▶ Photos taken during 'VRUTCI' Reservoir CB bloom



Press Clipping: Who is responsible?



Ужице - фото Ненад Ковачевић - ДАНАС

Waiting for water...

INTRO



Agencija: Nismo odgovorni za zam responsible
Vrutci

Vrutci

Serbian EPA: We are not responsible

Serbian EPA: We are not

SCENE

RA in WATER

ISSUES

STAMP STPA

REMARKS

Press Clipping: Who is guilty?

Ko је крив за ужите troubles... невоље с то water troubles... Who is guilty

... извориште, у периоду закумулације Врутци, већ од

maloj HE u Užicu upućen Tužilaštvu



Mihajlović je ukazala da je Republička direkcija za vode bila obavezna da pošalje inspekciju na taj objekat kao i da traži da se dobije vodna saglasnost, i dodala da pitanje (ne)dobijanja saglasnosti nije samo stvar javašluka

"Ta mala hidroelektrana je koristila više vode nego što je potrebno i spuštala nivo akumulacije", ukazala je

već je potrebno iskoreniti i kriminal i korupciju u toj oblasti.

Старост акумулације Врутци главни



INTRO RA in WATER **ISSUES STPA REMARKS SCENE STAMP**

Press Clipping: GM of Uzice WS detained!!!

Blic online, Tanjug | 22. 07. 2014. - 18:25h 18:28h

Priveden direktor užičkog Vodovoda



Direktor Vodovoda u Užicu Dragan Simić priveden je danas i određeno mu je zadržavanie sumnje da je učinio kriviy

GM of Uzice Water Supply Arrested Dragan Simic, GM of Uzice Water Sun today and detained, on suspicion of comm offense for causing general danger...

Vladimir Lojanica | 23. 07. 2014. - 19:07h | 18:28h | Komentara: 16

KO JE KRIV ZA HAOS U UŽICU Direktor vodovoda prvi osumnjičeni, neka se pripremi...

> Osnovni javni tužilac u Užicu Vukašin Vujičić izdao je nalog da se privede, zadrži i sasluša –

WHO IS TO BLAME FOR CHAOS IN UZICE GM of the Water Supply the first suspect Public prosecutor in Uzice issued a warrant to arrest, detain and interrogate...

RA in WATER ISSUES STPA INTRO SCENE STAMP REMARKS

- ▶ Harmful CB Blooms Development
- → lead to negative environmental, health and economic impacts
- produce secondary metabolites potentially toxic to secondary consumers
 - zooplankton, fish and mammals
 - humans

which use affected waters:

- as a habitat
- for drinking and recreational purposes









Recommendations for Public Water Systems to Manage Cyanotoxins in Drinking Water




- **▶** Harmful CB Blooms Consequences
- → Depending on the human organ affected, cyanotoxins (CTs) are classified as:
- hepatotoxins (which effect lever)
- neurotoxins (causes neurodegenerative diseases)
- cytotoxins (causes necrotic injury)
- skin and gastrointestinal irritants










- ▶ A Role of Public Health (PH) (inherently concerned with water supply)
- → Handling relationships between causalities of water-related issues:
- DISTAL (associated with social, environmental and engineering status) &



PROXIMAL (associated with microbiological or biological factors)

▶ A Role of Public Health (PH)

(among others)

- → Current PH RA approach:: based on cause effect relations
- fails to capture all of the risk factors involved, especially distal ones
- has difficulties to cope with unpredictable harmful events


INTRO | SCENE | RA in WATER | ISSUES | STAMP | STPA | REMARKS

- Water Sector Typical RA Methods
- → TRADITIONALLY:: retrospective approach
- previous experience provides main input for analyses
- → ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
- primarily concerned with envir quality issues:: water intake/discharge
- → WSP (Water Safety Plans) adapted form of HACCP with MB approach
- primarily concerned with health aspects
- → RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
- primarily concerned with pipe/pump failures technical aspect

- Water Sector Typical RA Methods
- → Increasing request:
 - → to expand strictly environmental, health or tech domain
 - → to integrate them (all aspects)
 - and also to include:
 - Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs)
 - all of Assets/System LifeCycle phases
 - all Players



ISSUE:: RISK



Risk = Probability ⊗ Severity

... hazard occurence
... exposure to hazard
... unwanted events
... emergence of consequences



Probability of CB Bloom?

Probability of CT Exposure?


What is the reality?

ISSUE:: RISK

→ Indicative research::


 Vrutci reservoir CB bloom and water usage ban from Uzice WSS (2013)


- → During the water usage ban:
- the majority of respondents (out of 320) did comply with restrictions,
- while some of them used water occasionally and daily
- → These data confirm difficulties in the exposure assessment, i.e. in assessment of potential consequences



Water usage during Uzice water ban, number of responds (total 320) (Drobac, 2015)

ISSUE:: RISK... AND NOW SERIOUS





▶ WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WSS) System of Systems interactive with other systems **Elements/Components/Assets of low and high importance** incorporated into the system and environment Sublimation of past, present and future both young and old Stakeholders often opposed state admin, local gyrnmnt, operators, designers, customers, ... **INTRO SCENE RA in WATER ISSUES STAMP STPA REMARKS**

- **▶ WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WSS)**
- → RISK under consideration must be comprehensive and total
- → RISK ANALYSIS methods:: consistent to the nature of the WSS



INTRO | SCENE | RA in WATER | ISSUES | STAMP | STPA | REMARKS

The first step in solving any problem is to understand it. We often propose solutions to problems that we do not understand and then are surprised when the solutions fail to have the anticipated effect

(Leveson, 1995)

HIERARCHICAL





DRINKING WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM



ADAPTIVE

RESILIENT

Infrastructure Systems: municipality owned (Serbian context)

O&M entrusted to WS Operator

Components/Assets: designed/built by different sides

uninformed in system behaviour

system performances depend on I-G/I-A

DM (components): FRAGMENTARY PROBLEM SOLVING

Systemic Approach: systemic events/causality/hazards

system-theoretic principle


INTRO | SCENE | RA in WATER | ISSUES | STAMP | STPA | REMARKS

ISSUE:: SYSTEM: WSS COMPLEXITY

High number of INFO:: a need to structure the problem

Data processing task:: change in abstraction level

on the level with less resolution



ISSUE:: SYSTEM: WSS COMPLEXITY

ABSTRACTION HIERARCHY :: (Rasmussen, 1981, 1986)

the way for coping with complexity

WSS :: pipes, fittings (bends, branches, connectors), manholes, ...

:: difficult for understanding

- ignoring details, put the attention on high level issues
- representation is event-independent:: system structure
- framework for knowledge representation

Different levels on reasoning about process

while consider technical issues: 5 categories

ISSUE:: SYSTEM: WSS SOCIO-TECHNICAL

Functional purpose

The overall system meaning and is purpose VERNMENT.

General and symbolic level of the s

:: syst m resources (Mass/Energy)

Generalised function

Generalised processes of reflects behavioural s

Physical function

Specific processes relat interacting components WATER OPERATOR balance models (M/E)

Top Management logical process schemes, technical

Middle Management

ementation, process development Line workers status and condition, setting up of pumps, valves, reservoirs

physical terms

Specific objects in the **WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM**physical terms

(SIZE OF THE STEE OF THE ST

(PHYSICAL FORM) ce, state, location

INTRO

SCENE

RA in WATER

ISSUES


STAMP

STPA

REMARKS

ISSUE:: SYSTEM: SYNTHESYS:: PARADIGM SHIFT

CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVES for looking at the problem



Not perceive risk just with future events!

RISK THAT IS OCCURED :: ACCIDENT ACCIDENT :: SYSTEM ACCIDENT

SYSTEM SAFETY

RISK concept have difficulties to cover all factors
SAFETY concept have potential to cover it


ISSUE:: SYSTEM: SYNTHESYS:: PARADIGM

DON'T PREVENT failures but MAKE things go wright


					6 6 6
	Defined by	Look into	Focus on	Based on	Management
RISK	NEGATIVE	EVENTS	FAILURES	OVERSIGHTS (FAULTS)	PRESCRIPTIVE
SAFETY (risk antipode)	POSITIVE	PROCESSES	HOW IT SHOULD BE	INSIGHT IN STATES	ADAPTIVE

INTRO	SCENE	RA in WATER	ISSUES	STAMP	STPA	REMARKS


STAMP CONCEPT



STAMP CONCEPT (Leveson, 2004)



STPA/CAST Exercise



STPA/CAST Exercise

WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 'UŽICE'


- VRUTCI Reservoir,
- Gravity Main,
- Water Treatment Plant (WTP),
- Water Distribution Network.


EVENTS

- 14/12/2013 Red stain on the lake surface:: reported by citizens
- 26/12/2013 Drinking water ban after 12 days from reported issue
- 07/02/2014 Ban lifted after 40 days from water ban

DEMONSTRATION OF APPLICATION of STAMP

- ideas from Systems Theory:: sum of components: The Whole & SC
- elements of Cognitive Engineering:: Man-Machine I-A





INTRO

SCENE

RA in WATER

ISSUES

STAMP

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REMARKS

STPA/CAST Exercise:: METHODOLOGY STEPS

Defining SA-SH-HLSR (System Accident, S_Hazards, H-L Safety Rqmts)

Defining HLCS (High-Level Control Structure)

- Adding details/levels (expanding/extending CS)

- Controler & Controled process analysis (defining USCA & SC)

Defining casual factors (Control Flaws)







STPA/CAST Exercise:: SA

SYSTEM ACCIDENT for **WSS** is defined in regard with::

- 1. Delivering of water quantity
- 2. Delivering of water quality
- 3. Economic sustainability
- 4. Social affordability
- 5. Envrmntl issues (water intake/discharge, energy consumption)

Sustainable

operation

development


OHS


- 6. Customer relations
- 7. Person and property safety/security

STPA/CAST Exercise:: FUNCTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE

FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR::


- FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE
- ABSTRACT FUNCTION
- GENERALISED FUNCTIONS
- PHYSICAL FUNCTIONS
- PHYSICAL FORM





STPA/CAST Exercise:: FUNCTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE

ADDING DETAILS/LEVELS::



STPA/CAST Exercise:: VIOLATED SAFETY CONSTRAINTS


INCORRECT PROCESS MODELS:

 flaws in consideration of a system as a whole:: also for the role of Small HPP THE WATER RESOURCES ENG COMMUNAL UTILITY SEPTICES WHOLE Reservoir Gravity not REDUCTIONISM Catchment **Distribution Network** but HOLISM **INTRO SCENE RA in WATER ISSUES STAMP STPA REMARKS**

STPA/CAST Exercise:: VIOLATED SAFETY CONSTRAINTS

INCORRECT PROCESS MODELS:

flaws in definition of the terms 'water intake' (different in several regulations),
 which entails substantial consequences



STPA/CAST Exercise:: IN VIOLATED SAFETY CONSTRAINTS

INCORRECT CONTROL ALGORITHM:

- lack of responsibilities for preservation of Sanitary Protected water source Area (SPA),
- flaws in regulations for testing drinking water quality (e.g. CT limits),
- flaws in water quality monitoring and reporting methodology (e.g. reporting to DM).



STPA/CAST Exercise:: VIOLATED SAFETY CONSTRAINTS

REFERENCE CHANNEL FLAWS:

other than drinking water purpose are not allowed for reservoir by regulation –
 small HPP was introduced, however

• Qm.c.1. (l/s)
• Qm.c.2. (l/s)
• Qm.c.2. (l/s)
• Pad темельних испуста
• Bodoctajy

flaws in fish management (e.g. wrong fish species loaded in the lake)

- flaws in reservoir management (e.g. excessive dewaterin

MEASURING CHANNEL FLAWS:

- flaws of state audit over SPA,
- flaws of audit over the extent of water quality testing,
- Annual Reports on environment and drinking water quality lack the adverse event:
 'nothing happened' nothing to decide about


COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FLAWS:

relationships between governmental departments, local authorities, operators


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INTRO	SCENE	RA in WATER	ISSUES	STAMP	STPA	REMARKS	

STPA/CAST Exercise:: MIGRATION MODEL

- → Uzice WSS controls degraded with time, if existed at all
- → Deviations have become normal in daily operations no one to see them







CONCLUDED REMARKS

- → Whole environmental and engineering socio-technical structure has contributed to the discussed adverse event
- → Partitioned responsibilities in managing different aspects of water among the institutions/actors at different governance levels (local, national) or at the same level (different departments or Ministries) or different professions (environmentalists, engineers, medical workers) had resulted in failure of making effective/timely decisions, either to prevent or to mitigate the issues
- → Initial public blame revealed as wrong, along with water experts which found themselves lost with detailed CB investigations - they pointed out that event was caused by reservoir maturity, flushing of manure from agricultural areas and high phosphorus content in reservoir

CONCLUDED REMARKS

Therefore, STAMP (Leveson, 2004) is quite appropriate Risk Analysis Method for WSS which are Systemic, Hierarchical, Complex, S-T, Adaptive, Resilient


PARADIGM SHIFT from Traditional to Systems approach of RA is offered (through SAFETY as a kind of antipode):

- system thinking about the whole, with lowering towards components through AH cognitive techniques
- based on processes (on system insight), not on events (on oversights),
 i.e. model independence from events
- covering integrated socio-technical system, with existance of complex relationships between technical, organisational and social aspects

BONUS TRACK:: SAFETY TEMPLE

SAFETY TEMPLE

as answer on prof. Leveson challenge (from 'An STPA Primer') for visualisation (illustration) of Safety :: not systemic but solid & transitional one from traditional perspective



BONUS TRACK:: GREETINGS FROM Belgrade









THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION