

# Using STPA trend analysis to determine key system drivers

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
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### Introduction


- Aircraft production is complex and can be hazardous
- Hazardous energy managed via Lockout-Tagout (LOTO)
  - Group Coordinator
  - Primary Authorized Employee
  - Authorized Employee
- Why do LOTO-related incidents and injuries occur?
- STPA method applied to LOTO
- Goal: Implement the most effective solutions

### STPA for Hazardous Energy Control


Manager / Team Lead



### STPA for Hazardous Energy Control



### STPA for Hazardous Energy Control



### STPA Example

# Controller & Control Action



### **Causal Scenarios**

### Primary Authorized Employee Perform Tryout Aircraft circuit, system, or component

#### Performing Tryout is Made Unsafe By:

- Performing Tryout on the wrong component
- Performing Tryout procedure incorrectly
- Performing the wrong Tryout procedure
- Not performing Tryout
- Performing Tryout too late
- Performing Tryout too soon (before energy is released)

#### Wrong Tryout Procedure Used Because:

- Employee doesn't know it's the wrong procedure
- Employee could not find the right procedure
- Employee was rushed and did not want to find the right procedure
- Higher authority employee suggested the procedure
- Etc....

### STPA Limitations

- Analysis results in too much data for easy comprehension
  - Controllers: 13
  - Control actions: 48
  - Unsafe control actions: 200
  - Causal scenarios that could result in incidents or injury: 958

Challenges

- How to put all of this data into context of the "bigger picture"?
- How to translate that knowledge into business decisions?

# Applying Trend Grouping

Three categories of system drivers:

- Mental models
- Inadequate information or resources
- Process deficiency

Which of these causes the greatest systemic impact?

How are they related?

How to prioritize and estimate improvement?


# Category Drivers by Group

Resources / Information	Process
Required people cannot be located	Inadequate training / experience
Production complexity	Unclear role assignments
Unavailable information	Unclear requirements
Required resources cannot be located	Process unenforced
Device failure	Unclear authority
	Required people cannot be located Production complexity Unavailable information Required resources cannot be located


### Trend Grouping Example

- Controller: Primary Authorized Employee (PAE)
  - Unsafe Control Action: Performs incorrect Tryout procedure because...
    - **Causal Scenario**: ... PAE was given an incorrect procedure, does not know where to find procedures and believes that taking the time to find a correct one would result in unacceptable production delay.
    - Trend Grouping: Assigning Key Drivers
      - Causal Action: Incorrect Tryout
      - Mental Model: Reacting to Time Pressure
      - Resource / Information Deficiency: Required resources cannot be located
      - (no process driver)

### Results




Actions



#### **Top Resources & Information by Action** Mental Model **Resources & Information Process** 25 Quantity Resources & Information: 452 20 Quantity Causal Scenarios 15 Unavailable Information Production Complexity Unavailable People 10 Unavailable Resources 5 0 Task / Role Did not Data Entry Configuration / Logbook Check In / Incorrect Deconflicting Process Assignment Access Error Removal Communicate


**Actions** 



### **Top Processes by Action**

Actions Mental Model Resources & Information Process

Quantity Process: 295



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**Resources & Information** 

# How STPA Results Translate to Business Priorities

Main Message: Focus on Areas with Greatest Systemic Impact

**Highest Priority Actions** 

- Focus on Reduction in Data Entry
  - Correlated with over <u>half each</u> of <u>Mental Model</u> and <u>Resource & Information</u> drivers
- Improve Accessibility to Information
  - Strong relationship with Configuration / Deconflicting errors
- Simplify Administrative Tasks
  - A third of causal actions are correlated with Time Pressure driver

**Lowest Priority Actions** 

- Revamp LOTO process: Smallest group of assigned drivers
- Heavier emphasis on "compliance"



- STPA provides detailed insight to incident and injury causality mechanisms
- Large quantities of data are generated
- Cut through complexity with trend grouping
- Enables prioritization of improvements based on estimated impact

