

# Why We Need Something New in the Automotive Industry

*Dr. Qi Van Eikema Hommes*


*April 19, 2012*

# 1896




Henry Ford in his first car, the Quadricycle, built in 1896

# Let The Robot Drive




Wired, Feb 2012, [http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff\\_autonomoucars/all/1](http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff_autonomoucars/all/1)

# Automotive Systems Today and Tomorrow



- **Cyber Physical Systems-** complex embedded devices networked to control physical hardware components.
- Software intensive.
- Automating many human tasks.
- The development teams are multidisciplinary and globally distributed.

# Quality Problem With no Component Failure



- Trouble-Not-Identified Engine Control Module warranty problem.
- No component failure was found.
- Insufficient resource to conduct exhaustive bottom-up testing, after the product was already released to market.
- Many such quality problems are never resolved.

# Toyota Unintended Acceleration

EARNINGS | February 9, 2011

## U.S. Blames Drivers, Not Toyota

Investigators Clear Car Electronics for Instances of Unintended Acceleration

Article

Video

Interactive Graphics

Stock



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Wall Street Journal

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BY JOSH MITCHELL, MIKE RAMSEY AND CHESTER DAWSON

Federal highway safety officials on Tuesday absolved the electronics of Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles for unintended acceleration, and said driver error contributed to the incidents.

## The Detroit News

www.detnews.com

April 6, 2010

<http://detnews.com/article/20100406/AUTO01/4060371>

## Toyota faces \$16.4M fine for hiding safety defect

Proposed penalty is largest ever sought by NHTSA officials

DAVID SHEPARDSON  
Detroit News Washington Bureau

Washington -- Federal safety regulators are seeking to fine Toyota Motor Corp. \$16.4 million -- the largest ever penalty against an automaker -- for failing to disclose problems with sticky accelerator pedals in a timely manner.

March 30, 2010

<http://detnews.com/article/20100330/AUTO01/3300329>

## NASA to help probe unintended auto acceleration

DAVID SHEPARDSON  
Detroit News Washington Bureau

Washington -- The U.S. Transportation Department will launch two major investigations to discover whether vehicle electronics or electromagnetic interference are to blame for unintended vehicle acceleration incidents.



# Typical Decomposition Scheme


- **Physical:** usually stated as systems, subsystems, subassemblies, parts
  - Car systems and subsystems include seats, engine, suspension, steering
- **Organizational:** Usually stated as divisions, departments, groups, etc.
  - Powertrain department, Research and Development division, etc.
- **Process:** usually stated as phases of the product development process.
  - Concept development, detailed design, etc.

# Example of a Vehicle Engineering






# Physical Decomposition



# Organization Decomposition



Adapted from: Michelle Sackas, *A Systems Engineering Approach to Improve Vehicle NVH Attribute Management*. MIT SDM Thesis, 2008.

# Process Decomposition



1. Concept	2. Research	3. Analysis	4. Develop	5. Launch
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<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Idea Generation:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requests</li> <li>Customer Pain</li> <li>Market Studies</li> <li>Legislation</li> <li>Competitors</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Key Deliverables:</p> <p>Product Concept Doc.</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess Market:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Segments &amp; Size</li> <li>Growth Potential</li> <li>Customer Needs</li> <li>Legal Issues</li> <li>Competition</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Key Deliverables:</p> <p>Market Research Report</p> <p>Market Req. Document</p> <p>Product Definition Statement</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Business Analysis:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cost/Benefit</li> <li>Resources Required</li> <li>Capital Expenses</li> <li>Profitability/Margin</li> <li>Anticipated Sales</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Key Deliverables:</p> <p>Business Case</p> <p>Profitability Analysis</p> <p>Product Req. Document</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Product Development:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical Specs</li> <li>Prototyping</li> <li>Trial Production</li> <li>Testing &amp; QA</li> <li>Test Market Selling</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Key Deliverables:</p> <p>Product Dev. Schedule</p> <p>Product Testing Report</p> <p>Test Market Sales Report</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Go To Market:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Marketing Plan</li> <li>Sales Training</li> <li>Distribution Plan</li> <li>Collateral Design</li> <li>Set Launch Date</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Key Deliverables:</p> <p>Product Launch Plan</p> <p>Product Launch Budget</p> <p>Product ROI Forecast</p> <p>Target Launch Date Set</p>
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
Checkpoint #1	Checkpoint #2	Checkpoint #3	Checkpoint #4	Checkpoint #5
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<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Deliverables</li> </ul> <p>Decisions:</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Deliverables</li> </ul> <p>Decisions:</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Deliverables</li> </ul> <p>Decisions:</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Deliverables</li> </ul> <p>Decisions:</p>	<p>Description of Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review Deliverables</li> </ul> <p>Decisions:</p>
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# The Effect of Decomposition

- Quality and safety = component failure prevention
  - Failure: Not performing intended function
- Quality and Safety Engineering = Reliability Engineering
- Component failures are random hardware failures
  - Not useful for complex software system
  - Not useful for social systems
- Bottom-up hazard analysis based on linear chain-of-events model, ignoring systemic factors.
- The reality: many unresolved quality problems.

# An Example of System Interactive Complexity: The Powertrain Control Software System




- 1 production-level software
- 117 software modules (red dots)
- 1423 interactions (black lines)
- 39 such production software releases per year
- <2 weeks per release


Hommes, DETC2008-DTM-49140

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### Average Number of Connections per Node




### Average % of Components Affected by a Design Change






# We Rely Heavily on Experts' Tacit Knowledge to Handle System Interactions and Integration



# ISO 26262 Functional Safety for Road Vehicle

- The first comprehensive standard that addresses safety related automotive systems comprised of electrical, electronic, and software elements that provide safety-related functions.
- Adaptation of IEC 61508 to road vehicles
- Influenced by ISO 16949 Quality Management System

# General Structure of ISO 26262



# Strengths

- Emphasizing safety management and safety culture
- Prescribes a systems engineering process
- Departure from safety as an after-thought:
  - IEC 61508: safety function
  - ISO 26262: provides the framework and vocabulary for hazard elimination in the first place
    - Systems engineering framework
    - Safety measure vs. safety mechanisms

# Suggestions for Improvements

- Safety measure is not clearly explained in the document, while Safety Mechanism is explained in detail throughout the document.
- The standard may want to add a section in Part 1 to further clarify the departure from IEC 61508's design philosophy.




# Reliability Engineering Methods in ISO 26262

- **Hardware Architecture Metrics**--Based on random failure of components.
- **Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)**
- **Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)**
- **Safety Case Approach**
  - Confirmation bias
  - Independent reviewers are less familiar with the design
  - The use of Quantitative Risk Assessment
- **Investigate the effectiveness of STPA and how to integrate it with the standards to provide higher safety assurance.**

# Software Safety

- Follows software system engineering process
- Promotes good software architecture practices
- Best practices in software design
- Addresses hardware failure
- On Par with other software safety standards such as DO-178



## Comments:

- Unlike hardware, software does not fail.
- Software faults are due to design errors, but the standard does not offer a way to identify design errors that can cause hazard.
- Good systems engineering process and software architecture design are necessary but not sufficient to ensure system safety.

# Summary

- Automotive systems have changed—more complex, software intensive, more automation.
- Reductionist approach is no longer adequate.
- ISO 26262 is our latest effort to address our new challenges. It can be improved by incorporating STPA.

# Proposal: Research Consortium on Automotive Functional Safety

- Industry – Government – Academia Collaboration
- Funded research projects
  - Develop a scientific framework for automotive electronics safety engineering
  - Develop a non-proprietary test bed that reflect the real world challenges
  - Educate future engineers
- Shared learning among members to
  - Improve design for safety
  - Improve industry standards
  - Support safety regulation

Thank you!

Questions?